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Abstract 
In this paper, we discuss an explanation for the fall in share of labour in GDP based on the rise of 
“superstar firms.” If globalization or technological changes advantage the most productive firms in 
each industry, product market concentration will rise as industries become increasingly dominated by 
superstar firms with high profit margins and a low share of labor in firm value-added and sales. As the 
importance of superstar firms increases, the aggregate labour share will fall. This hypothesis suggests 
that sales will increasingly concentrate in a small number of firms and that industries where 
concentration rises most will have the largest declines in the labour share. We find support for these 
predictions aggregating up micro-data from the US Census 1982-2012. 
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I. Introduction 
There has been an upswing of interest in economics and the media over the decline in the share of 
GDP going to labor. The stability of the labor share of GDP was one of the famous Kaldor (1961) 
“stylized facts” of growth. The macro stability of labor’s share was always, as Keynes remarked, 
“something of a miracle” and disguised instability at the industry level (Elsby et al. 2013). 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) emphasize that the decline in the labor share is not confined to 
the U.S. and occurs primarily within rather than between industries. Although there is controversy 
over the degree to which the fall in the labor share is due to measurement issues such as the 
treatment of housing (Rognlie 2015) and intangible capital (Koh et al. 2016), there is consensus 
that there has been a decline in the U.S. labor share since the 1980s particularly in the 2000s. 
Nevertheless, little consensus exits on the causes of the decline in the labor share. Elsby et al. 
(2013) argue for the importance of international trade and find that the labor share declines the 
most in U.S. industries strongly affected by import shocks. However, labor shares have also 
declined in most non-traded sectors such as wholesale, retail and utilities, a pattern not readily 
explained by rising trade.  
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) instead emphasize that the cost of capital has fallen relative to 
the cost of labor, driven especially by rapid declines in quality-adjusted equipment prices of 
information and communication technologies. A decline in the relative price of capital will lead to 
a decline in the labor share under CES production functions if the capital-labor elasticity of 
substitution is greater than unity. Although Karabarbounis and Neiman present evidence that the 
elasticity exceeds unity, the bulk of the empirical literature suggests a much lower elasticity (e.g. 
Lawrence 2015). Since changes in relative factor prices tend to be similar across firms, lower 
relative equipment prices should lead to greater capital adoption and falling labor shares in all 
firms. In Autor et al. (2017) we find the opposite: the unweighted mean labor share across firms 
has not increased much since 1982. Thus, the average firm shows little decline in its labor share. 
To explain the decline in the aggregate labor share, one must study the reallocation of activity 
among heterogeneous firms toward firms with low and declining labor shares.  
In Autor et al. (2017) we propose a new “superstar firm” model that emphasizes the role of firm 
heterogeneity in the dynamics of the aggregate labor share. We hypothesize that industries are 
increasingly characterized by a “winner take most” feature where one firm (or a small number of 
firms) can gain a very large share of the market. Large firms have lower labor shares if production 
requires a fixed amount of overhead labor in addition to a size-dependent variable labor input, or 
if markups in the product market correlate positively with firm size. Possible explanations for the 
growth of winner take most includes the diffusion of new competitive platforms (e.g. easier 
price/quality comparisons on the Internet), the proliferation of information-intensive goods  that 
have high fixed and low-marginal costs (e.g., software platforms and online services), or increasing 
competition due to the rising international integration of product markets. New technologies may 
also have strengthened network effects and favored firms that are more adept at adopting and 
exploiting new modes of production.  
This paper exposits and evaluates two core claims of the superstar firm explanation: (1) the 
concentration of sales among firms within an industry has risen across much of the U.S. private 
economy; and (2) industries with larger increases in concentration should experience a larger 
decline in labor’s share. 
II. Model
To see the intuition for a link between the rise of superstar firms and a decline in the labor share, 
consider a production function 𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾1−𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 where 𝑌𝑌 is value-added, 𝐴𝐴 is variable labor, 𝐾𝐾 is 
capital and 𝐴𝐴 is Hicks-neutral efficiency (“TFPQ”), which we assume is heterogeneous across 
firms. There is a fixed amount of overhead labor 𝐹𝐹 needed for production, so total labor is 𝐿𝐿 = 𝐴𝐴 +  𝐹𝐹. We assume that factor markets are competitive with wage 𝑤𝑤 and cost of capital 𝑟𝑟 being 
equal to the input factors’ marginal revenue products, while there is imperfect competition in the 
product market. From the static first order condition for labor, we can write the share of labor costs 
(𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿) in nominal value added (𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌) as: 
(1)  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = �𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖
where 𝜇𝜇 is the mark-up, the ratio of product price (𝑃𝑃) to marginal cost (𝑐𝑐), and 𝐹𝐹 is fixed overhead 
labor costs. The firm subscripts 𝑖𝑖 indicate that for given economy-wide values of (𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤 ,𝑤𝑤,𝐹𝐹) a firm 
will have a lower labor share if (i) its share of fixed costs in total revenues are lower or (ii) its 
mark-up is higher. Superstar firms (firms with high 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) will be larger because they produce more 
efficiently and capture a higher share of industry output. Superstar firms therefore will have a 
lower share of fixed costs in total revenues, and thus a lower labor share. In monopolistically 
competitive models, the mark-up is the same across firms in an industry: 𝜇𝜇 = 𝜌𝜌 (𝜌𝜌 − 1)⁄ , where 
𝜌𝜌 is the price elasticity of demand. However, in other models of imperfect competition, firms with 
larger market shares will be able to set higher mark-ups (e.g. Cournot competition), also leading 
to a negative relationship between firm size and labor shares. In either case, when there is an 
exogenous change that allocates more market share to a small number of large superstar firms, the 
aggregate labor share will fall as the economy shifts towards these low labor share firms. Autor et 
al (2017) formalize this idea in a simple superstar firm model for a monopolistically competitive 
setting. Distinct from the prior literature, the superstar firm model emphasizes the heterogeneity 
of firms within industries as being critical for understanding the fall in the labor share. We next 
show that, in line with the model’s mechanism, the concentration of sales across firms within 
industries has grown in most U.S. sectors. 
III. Data and Empirical Findings 
We use data from the U.S. Economic Census, conducted every five years to enumerate all 
establishments in select sectors on current economic activity. We focus on the Economic Census 
from 1982 to 2012 for six large sectors: manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, services, 
finance, and utilities and transportation. The covered establishments in these six sectors account 
for four-fifths of total private sector employment.  
For the six sectors, the Census reports each establishment’s annual payroll, output, employment, 
and an identifier for the firm to which the establishment belongs. To measure the concentration of 
sales within an industry, we use an output measure capturing total sales by the establishment during 
the survey year. To measure sales at the firm level, we aggregate the sales of all establishments 
that belong to the same firm and the same industry. If a firm operates establishments in several 
industries, each combination of firm and industry is counted as a separate firm, capturing the firm’s 
separate contributions to sales concentration in several industries. 
To implement our industry-level analysis, we assign each establishment in a given year to a 1987 
SIC-based time-consistent industry code as described in Autor et al. (2017). Our methodology 
yields 676 industries, 388 of which are in manufacturing. All of our measures use these time-
consistent industry definitions leading to measures of industry concentration that differ slightly 
from published statistics. The correlation between our calculated measures and those based on the 
published data is close to one, however, for periods without changes in industry definitions.  
We measure the concentration of sales within an industry as either the fraction of total sales 
accruing to its four largest firms (denoted CR4) or the fraction of sales accruing to its twenty 
largest firms (denoted CR20). Figure 1 plots the average CR4 and CR20 across four-digit 
industries for our six sectors from 1982 to 2012. The level of sales concentration varies 
considerably across sectors. In each year, the top four firms in an average manufacturing industry 
capture more than a third of the industry’s total sales, while the top four firms in the average service 
industry combine for less than a sixth of total sales. 
There is a remarkably consistent upward trend in concentration in each sector. In manufacturing, 
the sales concentration ratio among the top 4 increases from 38% to 43%; in finance, it rises from 
24% to 35%; in services from 11% to 15%; in utilities from 29% to 37%; in retail trade from 15% 
to 30% and in wholesale trade from 22% to 28%. Over the same period, there were similar or 
larger increases in CR20 for sales. 
To further characterize the emergence of superstar firms, Figure 1 also plots CR4 and CR20 
concentration measures based on firm employment rather than sales. Again, we observe a rising 
concentration in all six sectors for 1982 to 2012, although employment concentration has grown 
notably more slowly than sales concentration in finance, services, and especially in manufacturing. 
The pattern suggests that firms may attain large market shares with a relatively small workforce, 
as exemplified by Facebook and Google.  
  
 
FIGURE 1. AVERAGE TOP-4 INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP 
This figure plots the average concentration ratio in six major sectors of the U.S. economy. Industry concentration is calculated for each time-
consistent 4-digit industry code as described in Autor et al. (2017), and then averaged across all industries within each of the six sectors. The solid 
blue line (circles), plotted on the left axis, shows the average fraction of total industry sales that is accounted for by the largest 4 firms in that 
industry, and the solid red line (triangles), also plotted on the left axis, shows the average fraction of industry employment utilized in the 4 largest 
firms in the industry. Similarly, the dashed green line (circles), plotted on the right axis, shows the average fraction of total industry sales that is 
accounted for by the largest 20 firms in that industry, and the dashed orange line (triangles), also plotted on the right axis, shows the average fraction 
of industry employment utilized in the 20 largest firms in the industry. 
  
In Autor et al. (2017) we show that the two main qualitative findings of Figure 1 are robust to the 
use of an industry’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Sales have become more concentrated in 
each of the six broad sectors of the U.S. economy.  
A measurement challenge for our conclusion of rising concentration for broad U.S. sectors is that 
our concentration measures are calculated exclusively using U.S. based establishments. Thus, our 
measures include production by foreign multinationals operating in the U.S., but they exclude 
imports. A measure only for the market shares of U.S. producers may mischaracterize 
concentration trends given rising import shares, particularly for manufacturing.  
We assess the importance of trade in the competitive structure of manufacturing by calculating 
import-adjusted concentration ratios that treat imports from major country groups as if they belong 
to a single firm. Figure 2 plots the import-adjusted CR4 and CR20 measures along with the original 
measures only for U.S.-based establishments. The series with and without trade adjustment track 
each other closely, reaffirming our main finding of rising sales concentration. The slightly higher 
level of the adjusted concentration ratios implies that foreign producers (such as China) account 
for a sizable fraction of sales in some manufacturing industries. Imports in such industries likely 
originate from a small number of major foreign firms, but our data do not permit a firm-level 
breakdown of imports.  
   
FIGURE 2. INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION ADDING IMPORTS 
This figure plots the average sales concentration in U.S. 4-digit manufacturing industries from 1992 to 2012. The red line (triangles) plots the 
average fraction of total sales by domestic firms that is accounted for by an industry’s 4 largest firms (corresponding to the CR-4 Sales data series 
in the top left panel of Figure 1). The green line (squares) plots the fraction of the total U.S. market, defined as sales by domestic firms plus industry 
imports, which is produced by an industry’s 4 largest “firms”, where each group of exporting countries is counted as an individual firm. Imports 
are based on UN Comtrade data as described in Autor et al. (2017), and the 6 country groups are: Canada, Mexico/CAFTA, China, low income 
countries except China, 8 developed countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland), and rest of 
the world. On average, 0.94 country groups are among the top 4 “firms” in the left panel, and 2.7 country groups are among the top 20 “firms” in 
the right panel of the figure. 
A further implication of our superstar firm model is that the labor share should fall differentially 
in industries that are experiencing larger increases in concentration. Intuitively, the causal force in 
our model is the shift in competitive conditions (fall in 𝜌𝜌), which reallocates market share to larger 
and more productive firms. Indeed, Autor et al. (2017) document a strong negative relationship in 
the cross section between a firm’s market share and its labor share. Thus, rising concentration and 
falling labor shares should move in tandem, both in aggregate and between industries.  
Autor et al. (2017) test this implication by estimating bivariate regressions of five-year changes in 
the payroll share of value-added on the contemporaneous change in concentration for the 388 
manufacturing industries for the years 1987 – 2012. Figure 3, sourced from Autor et al. (2017), 
summarizes these regressions. In the initial five years of our sample, we detect no significant cross-
industry relationship between rising concentration and falling labor share. But the cross-industry 
relationship between rising concentration and falling labor share becomes negative and significant 
in the next five-year interval, and grows in absolute magnitude across each subsequent interval. In 
the final period from 2007 to 2012, we estimate that each percentage point rise in an industry’s 
CR20 concentration index predicts a 0.4 percentage point fall in its labor share. We also observe 
a similar negative relationship between changes in the share of labor in sales and concentration in 
all six sectors. 
 
FIGURE 3. CORRELATION BETWEEN CHANGES IN LABOR SHARE AND CHANGES IN INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. MANUFACTURING SECTOR AT 
FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1982/87 – 2007/12 
This figure plots point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from Autor et al. (2017) for OLS bivariate regressions of the change in the payroll 
to value-added share on the change in the CR20 index and a constant,, estimated at the level of 4-digit U.S. manufacturing industries and separately 
for each of the indicated five-year intervals. Regressions are weighted by industries’ shares of value-added in 1982.  
Why has industry sales concentration increased? One set of explanations involves a technological 
change that has made markets increasingly “winner take most” so that superstar firms with higher 
productivity increasingly capture a larger slice of the market. Or if incumbents are more likely to 
innovate and the persistence of incumbent’s innovative advantage has risen (Acemoglu and 
Hildebrand 2017), the incumbent advantage would increase and so would incumbents’ market 
shares.  
An alternative set of explanations posits that higher concentration could arise from anti-
competitive forces whereby dominant firms are increasingly able to prevent actual and potential 
rivals from entering and expanding (Barkai 2016). For instance, firms may lobby for regulatory 
barriers that complicate market entry/expansion for new and small firms. Higher entry barriers 
would enable incumbents to have higher monopolistic rents and therefore lower the labor share. 
In the first set of explanations, the industries becoming increasingly concentrated will tend to be 
more dynamic with higher productivity and technical change. By contrast in the second set of 
explanations, the concentrating industries are likely to be dominated by less productive and less 
dynamic incumbents.  
To shed light on these alternatives, we explored the relationship between changes in concentration 
and changes in other industry characteristics. Data limitations restrict this analysis to 
manufacturing. We find that the industries that became more concentrated over our sample period 
were also the industries in which productivity—measured by either output per worker, value-added 
per worker, TFP, or patents per worker—increased the most. Interestingly, there is no strong 
relationship between the change in concentration and the change in average wages. The findings 
suggest that a positive productivity-concentration relationship will most likely feature in any 
plausible explanation of rising industry concentration.  
IV. Conclusions 
We have considered a “superstar firm” explanation for the much-discussed fall in labor share of 
GDP. Our hypothesis is that technology or market conditions—or their interaction—have evolved 
to increasingly concentrate sales among firms with superior products or higher productivity 
thereby enabling the most successful firms to control a larger market share. Because these superstar 
firms are more profitable, they will have a smaller share of their labor in total sales or value added. 
Consequently, the aggregate share of labor falls as the weight of superstar firms in the economy 
grows. The model yields many predictions that are elaborated and tested in Autor et al. (2017). A 
key underpinning of the superstar firm explanation for declining labor share is that sales should 
become increasingly concentrated in a small number of firms across a wide range of industries. 
Consistent with the model, we find that the concentration of sales (and of employment) has indeed 
risen from 1982 to 2012 in each of the six major sectors covered by U.S. Economic Census. In 
Autor et al. (2017), we further show that those industries where concentration rises the most have 
the sharpest falls in the labor share, and that the fall in the labor share is mainly due to a reallocation 
of labor towards firms with lower (and declining) labor shares, rather than due to declining labor 
shares within most firms. 
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